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A B S T R A C T
This paper examines the effect of education aid on primary enrolment and education quality. Using the
most recent data on aid disbursements and econometric speciﬁcations inspired by the general aid
effectiveness literature, we ﬁnd some evidence that donors’ increase in funding has substantially
contributed to the successful increase in enrolment over the last 15 years. The most robust effect is
obtained by aid for education facilities and training. In addition, we ﬁnd complementarities between aid
for primary and secondary education. Our qualitative comparative analysis of education quality also
highlights the relevance of a balanced mix of educational expenditures.
 2015 UNU-WIDER. Published by Elsevier Ltd. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND
license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).
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While aid effectiveness with respect to overall economic
development has been studied for many years, looking at
individual sectors is a more recent phenomenon. For education,
initial studies by Michaelowa (2004), Michaelowa and Weber
(2007, 2008), Wolf (2007), as well as Dreher et al. (2008) were
followed by a number of complementary studies with further
differentiations of the dependent variable, varying methods to deal
with potential endogeneity, and a distinction between bilateral
and multilateral aid (Arndt et al., 2011; Breitwieser and Wick,
2012; Christensen et al., 2010, 2011, 2012; D’Aiglepierre, 2011;
D’Aiglepierre and Wagner, 2010; Findley et al., 2009; Gyimah-
Brempong and Aziedu, 2008). Perhaps this fast development of
the literature is due to the fact that looking at this sectorial analysis
is somehow more rewarding than looking at aid in general. A
more direct link between input and outcome variables facilitates
the conceptualization of the impact chain and circumvents some
of the thorny issues regarding, notably, the adequate temporal
relationship (cf. the debate on ‘early impact aid’ by Clemens et al.,
2012). While it is certainly interesting to see whether aid for
education also has an indirect effect on growth, education is an
objective in itself, and – especially at the basic level – an important
dimension of empowerment and poverty reduction. Thus universal* Corresponding author.
E-mail addresses: kassandra.birchler@yale.edu (K. Birchler),
katja.michaelowa@pw.uzh.ch (K. Michaelowa).
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.ijedudev.2015.11.008
0738-0593/ 2015 UNU-WIDER. Published by Elsevier Ltd. This is an open access articl
4.0/).primary education was prominently listed within the Millennium
Development Goals (MDGs), and the simple quantitative goal was
augmented by a consideration of education quality in the Dakar
Framework for Action adopted by the World Education Forum in
2000. The recently agreed Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs)
that replaced the earlier MDGs in September 2015 explicity
include the quality perspective and aim for: ‘‘inclusive and
equitable quality education’’ (Goal 4).
Just as the literature cited above, this paper focuses on the
direct link between aid and educational outcomes. Starting with
the speciﬁcation in Michaelowa and Weber (2007), we replace the
aid commitment data in our structural (ﬁve-year) panel by the
more appropriate Development Assistance Committee (DAC)
disbursement data, for which a sufﬁciently long time series is
now available. Moreover, we simplify the estimation procedure
drawing upon the arguments by Clemens et al. (2012) regarding
the literature on aid and growth. In addition, we go beyond the
existing literature by distinguishing between different types of
education aid, and by considering that there may be a quality–
quantity trade-off that should also be considered. The idea is to
get as concretely as possible to the analysis of questions with
direct relevance for aid allocation decisions, namely the question
which types of aid (or which combinations thereof) have been
particularly useful in order to improve primary education coverage
and quality. While we focus on primary education, it will become
clear that this educational sub-sector cannot be considered in
isolation, but depends on the functionality of the education
system as a whole.e under the CC BY-NC-ND license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/
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Section 2 presents some initial descriptive statistics and a brief
literature review on aid effectiveness in education. Section 3
provides our econometric analysis of the effect of overall education
aid on primary enrolment. Section 4 presents additional results for
sub-categories of education aid, using Qualitative Comparative
Analysis (QCA), an empirical method speciﬁcally designed for
small samples. Section 5 proceeds with an analysis of education
quality. Section 6 concludes.
2. Setting the stage: a ﬁrst glance at the data, and an overview
of the existing literature
In his article ‘The cartel of good intentions’, Easterly (2002, p.
45) shows a graph strongly suggesting that economic development
is negatively correlated to foreign aid. While such a simple
presentation of uncontrolled time series may be misleading, it
provides an initial starting point for further analysis. Looking
speciﬁcally at the education sector, the initial comparison of trends
looks rather favorable (see Fig. 1).
For all regions in the lower part of the graph, primary education
coverage – measured here in terms of net enrolment rates (NER) –
increases more or less steadily along with a rise in education aid.
For the regions in the upper part of the graph, enrolment rates did
not increase much or did not increase at all, but this simply reﬂects
that for most of the countries covered, the NER has been at or close
to its maximum of 100% right from the beginning. In these cases, a
further increase can obviously not be expected, and education aid
presumably focused on either the increase in education quality or
on other levels of education (cf. the discussion of aid sub-categories
in Sections 4 and 5).
While parallel trends do not directly imply any positive causal
effect of aid on education outcomes, most of the existing
econometric literature cited above has conﬁrmed the generally
positive link between education aid and education outcomes, and
claims to have established causality by a variety of methods of
instrumentation.1 While the magnitude and the signiﬁcance of the
effect vary substantially between different studies (as does the
interpretation of how large the effect must be in order to be
considered as ‘substantial’), a consensus about an overall positive
effect is emerging much more clearly than for development aid
more generally. The only two studies initially reporting fully
insigniﬁcant or even negative effects (Christensen et al., 2010;
Findley et al., 2009) have been further elaborated upon by (some
of) the authors to consider potential selection effects and related
endogeneity, and now provide some positive evidence, at least for
bilateral aid (Christensen et al., 2011, 2012). The availability of DAC
aid disbursement data by sector since the early 1990s has further
increased the precision of more recent estimations which reinforce
the tentatively positive results of the earlier literature (D’Aigle-
pierre, 2011; D’Aiglepierre and Wagner, 2010). Results of the
existing literature also indicate that it is useful to disaggregate
education aid even further (Christensen et al., 2010, 2011; Findley
et al., 2009).
While the existing studies use a variety of different indicators
for education outcomes (e.g., enrolment rates, completion rates, or
years of schooling) all of these indicators are strongly related and
basically measure the same concept, namely education coverage
(quantity). However, spending several years at school does not
necessary imply that children are able to read and understand even1 Dreher et al. (2008), for instance, use GMM methods (for an explanation, see
Section 3), or, alternatively, governance indicators and child mortality as
instruments in a two-staged least squares approach. D’Aiglepierre and Wagner
(2010) use the adoption of the Fast Track Initiative. These and other instrumenta-
tion strategies will be further discussed below.a simple text. Seurat (2012, p. 65), for instance, compares the
literacy information provided by different household surveys to
the information on years of schooling, and ﬁnds that in ﬁve out of
eight sub-Saharan African (SSA) countries considered, even after
ﬁve years of primary education, the ability to read a few simple
sentences is below 50%. Since international policy goals refer to
both, education quantity and quality, it may be even more
surprising that hardly any studies have attempted to address this
question in the context of aid effectiveness so far.
The problem is related to the lack of appropriate large-N
internationally comparable survey data on education quality in
developing countries. While there are two studies that do attempt
to capture some aspects of education quality, they need to rely on
more or less questionable proxies. D’Aiglepierre and Wagner
(2010) use repetition rates and pupil–teacher ratios (PTR), but
acknowledge that these variables are at best crude measures of the
quality of education. Indeed, education production function
estimations based on student surveys in Africa show that the
relationship between class size and student achievement is
generally rather weak (see, e.g., Michaelowa, 2001). Such a
relationship is even less obvious for repetition rates. More
convincingly, Wolf (2007) uses youth literacy rates, but this is
not necessarily linked to improvements in the education system as
literacy may also be acquired outside school. Moreover, using
literacy rates again raises the question of how much time should be
allowed for aid to become effective before a measurable effect can
be expected.
In fact, in the economic literature, there seems to be a broad
consensus that the best available information on education quality
can be drawn from the international achievement tests, such as
Program for International Student Assessment (PISA) or Trends in
International Mathematics and Science Study (TIMSS). Hanushek
and Woessmann (2009) compile the information available from
different tests into a large panel database. Unfortunately, those
data do not cover many poor developing countries and focus on
secondary rather than primary education. Altinok and Murseli
(2007) use a similar approach including information on primary
education and for a higher number of developing countries, but
rely on the additional and rather implausible assumption that the
variance in test scores is entirely driven by the population tested,
rather than by the design of the tests.
While the lack of appropriate data thus excludes a reliable panel
data analysis for developing countries, student assessment
programs do exist, even for sub-Saharan Africa, and they even
provide repeated country-level information for up to three
different survey periods. The largest coverage is provided by the
Southern and Eastern Africa Consortium for Monitoring Education
Quality (SACMEQ). SACMEQ includes repeated information for
15 country cases which is sufﬁcient to carry out a basic QCA using
logical links rather than statistical associations. This data will be
used in Section 5.
3. The effect of education aid on primary enrolment
To start our analysis, we estimate a series of general regression
models relating overall education aid to primary enrolment rates.
The extent, to which aid earmarked for primary education or for
other speciﬁc purposes related to the primary level shows a
stronger effect, will be discussed in Section 4. For the moment, we
start from the perspective that in their internationally agreed
objectives, donors highlighted the relevance of primary education
outcomes. If the allocation of funds within education aid does not
correspond to this objective, this may be one of the inefﬁciencies
we might want to detect.
We start with a replication of the regressions of Table 1 in
Michaelowa and Weber (2007), applying just a few changes in data
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Fig. 1. Aid for education and primary enrolment rates, by region. Notes: the vertical axes to the left show enrolment rates while the ones to the right measure aid
disbursements. Some caution is required when interpreting these graphs: (1) the measurement of NER is based on regional averages and (due to some missing values) the
countries included in this average calculation are not always the same. This explains the irregularities of the curves and notably their periodical downturns. For South Asia, no
information at all was available for 1996 and 1997. The corresponding values are based on extrapolation using information on enrolment in 1990; (2) until the early 2000s,
reporting by individual donors to the OECD’s Creditor reporting system (CRS) was incomplete leading to data coverage of less than 60% before 2002 for aid disbursements as a
whole. It must be assumed that the education sector, too, suffers from severe underreporting. From 2002 onwards, however, coverage has reached at least 90% except for the
last year (2010) for which information gathering might not have been complete in November 2012 when this analysis was carried out.
Source: See Appendix, Table A1.
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outlined below. Our dependent variable is the net primary
enrolment rate (NER, in %). The central explanatory variable
EDUCAID includes all aid disbursements for education as reported
to the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development
(OECD) Creditor reporting system (CRS), in constant 2010 US$. The
value is expressed in per capita of the recipient country population
in order to take into account that large countries need more
resources to improve their education coverage than small
countries do.
Control variables include the lagged NER (L.NER) that reﬂects
the enrolment situation at the start of each period and thus allows
us to take into account that it should be much more difﬁcult to
reach a high level of enrolment from a low starting point.
Moreover, we include the recipient governments’ own expenditure
on education as a share of GNI (EDUCEXP) because governments
are sometimes co-funding the investments supported through
development assistance, so that omitting this variable might
unduely inﬂate the coefﬁcient of aid.2 Other controls reﬂect
structural characteristics of the education system, namely the
prevailing pupil–teacher ratio (PTR), and the share of the
population under 15 years of age (YOUNG POP). Both indicate
structural difﬁculties a country may have in increasing enrolment
rates. A similar argument can be made for GDP per capita since GDP
constrains the government’s own budget and hence its possibility
to invest in education. Finally, we control for economic and2 As sector budget aid has become more popular in recent years, there may be
some overlap between EDUCEXP and EDUCAID. However, we consider that most aid
is still project or program funding that is not accounted for in national budgets. For
this reason, we keep EDUCEXP as a control. General budget support is covered by a
different category in the OECD/DAC data. In any case, alternative regressions
without EDUCEXP yield very similar results regarding the effect of aid.political governance using the budget surplus or deﬁcit (BUDGET),
INFLATION, openness to trade (OPEN), and the mean value of
political freedom and civil liberties FREE. While good governance is
generally correlated with development-oriented government
preferences that can be expected to inﬂuence educational
outcomes, it also affects donors’ propensity to grant development
assistance.
Variables were imputed by linear imputation based on other,
closely related variables (e.g., gross enrolment rates as a predictor
for NER, or expenditure per student as a predictor for EDUCEXP) or
on values for adjacent years. Missing value indicators were created
to capture any systematic difference of observations for which the
value of any of the right-hand side variables was missing before
imputation. They are systematically included as controls in all our
regressions although they are not listed in the corresponding
tables in order not to distract the reader from the more substantial
variables. For further details on all variables including descriptive
statistics and data sources, see Appendix, Table A1.
In the ﬁrst step of our analysis, the only change with respect to
our earlier work is that we now use more recent data, which in turn
allows us to use aid disbursements, rather than commitments.
Data on ofﬁcial development assistance (ODA) disbursements
are more appropriate, because commitments do not necessarily
turn into actual spending, and if they do, this does not happen
immediately. Over the last 20 years donor reporting on disburse-
ments has improved considerably reaching full reporting by 2007,
and 90% coverage since 2002. Considering the trade-off between
the number of years available for the analysis and data coverage,
we decided to start our time series in the mid-1990s, covering
the period from 1996 to 2010. Just as in our earlier paper, we
aggregate this information over ﬁve-year periods in order to
capture the structural change of those variables that only change
slowly over time. We average all variables except NER over the
Table 1
The effect of education aid on primary school enrolment (countries with initial
NER < 80%).a
Variables (1)
System GMMb
(2)
FEc
(3)
FEc
(4)
FEc,d
NER (%) NER (%) NER
growth (%)
NER
growth (%)
L.NER 0.32** 0.04
(0.04) (0.64)
EDUCAID per capita 0.04** 0.05*** 0.01 5.63*
(0.01) (0.01) (0.79) (0.09)
EDUCEXP 0.06 0.38 0.52 7.72
(0.88) (0.12) (0.55) (0.42)
PTR 0.26** 0.20 0.17 9.68
(0.01) (0.17) (0.64) (0.55)
YOUNG POP 0.22 0.35 2.02* 53.25
(0.24) (0.48) (0.07) (0.16)
GDP per capita 0.00 0.00*** 0.00 5.38
(0.61) (0.01) (0.92) (0.65)
BUDGET (surplus) 0.12 0.20 1.85*** 1.51***
(0.63) (0.48) (0.00) (0.00)
INFLATION 0.02 0.02 0.49** 6.53**
(0.24) (0.73) (0.03) (0.03)
OPEN 0.04 0.07 0.10 3.17
(0.11) (0.10) (0.48) (0.82)
FREE 1.13** 3.02 11.02** 10.45**
(0.03) (0.12) (0.01) (0.02)
Observations 260 260 260 257
Countries 110 110 110 110
R2 (within) 0.51 0.30 0.32
Wald chi2(18) = 584.9
(0.00)
Hansen chi2(6) = 4.03
(0.67)
AR1 z = 0.916
(0.36)
AR2 .
Source: See Appendix, Table A1.
a Constant or ﬁxed effects (as relevant, see below), and missing value indicators
for imputed variables are included but not shown. The preﬁx ‘L.’ denotes a lagged
variable. Robust p-values in parentheses.
b Replication of Michaelowa and Weber (2007, Table 1, Regression 4) with new
dataset (see also Appendix Table A3).
c Including both country and period ﬁxed effects.
d Explanatory variables and controls are all in logs except for BUDGET (because of
the numerous negative values) and FREE, which is a categorical variable.
* Signiﬁcance at the 10% level.
** Signiﬁcance at the 5% level.
*** Signiﬁcance at the 1% level.
3 At the same time, if the coefﬁcient of L.NER cannot be interpreted, we do not
know whether the effects measured for the other variables relate more to the level
of education or to its change (the closer the true coefﬁcient is to one, the more the
model refers to the change in outcomes rather than the level). Overall, the proper
interpretation of the relevant coefﬁcients, too, may thus represent a problem even if
only the coefﬁcient of L.NER is biased. The additional GMM regression is thus
helpful at least to assess the actual effect of L.NER.
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variable at the end of the period. This leaves us with three periods
of observation for the explanatory and control variables (1996–
2000, 2001–2005, and 2006–2010), and four periods for the
dependent variable, for which we need an additional observation
due to the dynamic structure of our model.
Methodologically, in this initial step, we do not change anything
as compared to our earlier analysis. As in Michaelowa and Weber
(2007), we use generalized method of moments (GMM) regres-
sions that were speciﬁcally developed to avoid bias related to the
inclusion of the lagged dependent variable (here: L.NER) in the
setting of a dynamic panel model, and simultaneously instrument
for other potentially endogenous variables. The idea of these
models is to make use of lagged differences (Arellano and Bond,
1991) and, in addition, lagged levels (system GMM, see Blundell
and Bond, 1998) as instruments for these endogenous variables.
While they are usually reasonably well correlated with the right-
hand side variables, they are assumed not to affect the dependent
variable directly, and not to suffer from the same endogeneity
problems as the variables for whose instrumentation they are
used.
The results of this initial replication are presented in the
Appendix (Table A2). In line with Michaelowa and Weber (2007,Table 1) we run ﬁve regressions, varying in the method used
(Arellano&Bond or Blundell&Bond; robust standard errors; ENER-
GYAID as an additional instrument), and in the variables
considered as endogenous. Along with L.NER, EDUCAID is always
considered as endogeneous because the current NER may reversely
cause the amount of education aid (and some reverse causality
may persist despite the control for lagged NER). In a similar way
government expenditure for education may be driven by need
reﬂected in the current NER. ENERGYAID was considered as
potentially interesting to increase the predictive power of the set of
instruments because, in the earlier sample based on commitment
data, aid across sectors appeared to be highly correlated (while at
the same time, the reverse causality problem with respect to the
NER should not exist).
In a second step, we consider that progress over time allowed
many countries to approach full primary enrolment already in the
early 1990s, so that there was not much leeway for further
improvements in primary education coverage. We therefore limit
the dataset to countries with an initial NER below 80%. Table A3 in
the Appendix presents the results, which are similar to those of
Table A2, but still show some changes in coefﬁcients and
signiﬁcance levels. As we believe that this restricted dataset
should lead to more precise results regarding primary education
outcomes, this also represents the selection of observations for the
main tables in Sections 3 and 4.
Table 1 presents our new analysis. As a baseline, Regression (1)
is a copy of the preferred model in the speciﬁcation of the
replication table based on the ﬁnal dataset (Appendix, Table A3,
Regression (4)). The speciﬁc model is preferred to the other GMM
models in Michaelowa and Weber (2007) because: (i) it uses
Blundell and Bond’s system GMM thereby including some of the
information on levels for the instruments (rather than differences
only); (ii) it is careful with respect to the deﬁnition of potentially
endogenous variables (considering not only L.NER and EDUCAID,
but also EDUCEXP as endogenous); and (iii) it restricts the number
of instruments to one per variable and lag distance (=25 in total) as
an attempt to improve the general test statistics.
Despite this reduction to a minimum of instruments, the times
series available for disbursement data is so short that the general
regression statistics for Regression (1) (and all regressions in
Tables A2 and A3 in the Appendix) are not very meaningful. First
order autoregression is present by default, but cannot be detected
here; second order autoregression tests cannot even be computed.
In fact, these problems also plague the other regressions in
Tables A2 and A3, i.e., the replication of Michaelowa and Weber
(2007) based on the shorter disbursement dataset.
In general, the use of GMM models has been widely debated in
recent years because they tend to be highly sensitive to slight
changes in the speciﬁcation. Indeed, the lack of robustness was
already noted in Michaelowa and Weber (2007), and the problem
is evident when considering Tables A2 and A3 in the Appendix.
Moreover, Monte Carlo analysis suggests that bias due to the
lagged dependent variable in a normal ﬁxed effects (FE) regression
model is largely concentrated on the coefﬁcient of this variable
itself (Judson and Owen, 1999, p. 12). Thus as long as we are not
interested in the interpretation of the effect of lagged dependent
variable (L.NER), this might not be too much of a concern.3
Regression (2) thus presents the results of a simple FE
regression including both country and period ﬁxed effects. While
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coefﬁcient and signiﬁcance of EDUCAID is remarkably stable.
Nevertheless, the problem remains that EDUCAID may not be
exogenous to the enrolment rates (despite the fact that it refers to a
period prior to the measurement of the dependent variable and the
fact that L.NER is controlled for). As mentioned above, Michaelowa
and Weber (2007), suggest energy aid as a possible instrument
since for the 1970–2000 commitments data, it was reasonably
correlated to education aid data. However, unfortunately, using the
new disbursement data, the correlation with education aid drops
dramatically, and energy aid is not signiﬁcant at all in the ﬁrst stage
of a standard instrumental variable FE regression.4 Other types of
aid that are more closely correlated to education aid (e.g., health
aid) are not convincing in terms of exogeneity. D’Aiglepierre and
Wagner (2010) use the year of the Fast Track Initiative (FTI)
endorsement as an instrument. However, as this initiative has been
primarily targeted toward countries that are lagging behind in
terms of educational outcomes, it is again endogenous to NER.
Similarly, instruments based on donors’ political interest – often
used in general aid effectiveness regressions – have been shown to
be problematic as they reﬂect only a speciﬁc, less development-
oriented type of aid (Dreher et al., 2014). As noted in Clemens et al.
(2012), instrumenting with such bad instruments may lead to
results that are even more misleading than a simple FE regression.
We thus decide to avoid the introduction of such instruments.
In any case, it should be noted that in the context of Regression (2),
reverse causality would lead to a downward bias of our estimates,
so that the coefﬁcient in our regression can be considered as some
kind of a lower bound for the actual size of the effect.
Nevertheless, there may be a way to get closer to a plausibly
unbiased estimation, not only regarding EDUCAID but also
regarding some of the controls, notably EDUCEXP. Clemens et al.
(2012) argue that regressions related to aid effectiveness for
growth can be considered as more or less unbiased, once country
and time FE have been introduced. Obviously, the risk of
endogeneity would have been much larger if income levels rather
than growth had been the dependent variable. In our case, the
dependent variable is speciﬁed in terms of the level of education
coverage. Using education growth rates instead should equally
reduce potential bias. In Regressions 3 and 4, we therefore
introduce the rate of change in enrolments (in %) as the new
dependent variable. This also avoids the above mentioned
problems related to the inclusion of the L.NER by simply moving
this variable to the other side of the equation.
Regression (3) shows that with this change, EDUCAID loses all
of its signiﬁcance. However, this seems to be largely related to a
non-linear relationship between aid and growth in enrolments.
When specifying the right-hand-side variables in logs (all except
BUDGET because of the high number of negative values, and FREE
because it is a categorical variable), EDUCAID again becomes
signiﬁcant (Regression (4)). As a rough approximation, the
coefﬁcient indicates that doubling annual education aid per capita
for a period ﬁve consecutive years implies a 5.6% increase in net
enrolment rates.
It should be recognized, however, that the coefﬁcient is
signiﬁcant only at the 10% level, and oscillates around this limit
depending on speciﬁcation. In a replication of all regressions of
Table 1 for the dataset with all countries (not limited to those with
NER < 80%), the coefﬁcient of EDUCAID in Regression (4) only has
a p-value of 0.13 (see Appendix, Table A4). In regressions omitting
our standard indicator variables for imputed values (see note 1 in
Table 1), EDUCAID again turns signiﬁcant.4 This also implies that with the new data, Regression (5) in Appendix Tables A2
and A3 is not a very convincing speciﬁcation.As mentioned above, using data from 1996 onwards also raises
concerns regarding data coverage for the EDUCAID variable. It is
important to avoid spurious correlations due to the rise of
enrolments happening simultaneously with an increase not in
the actual aid but in reporting. Indeed a comparison between CRS
and DAC statistics for overall aid shows that in our ﬁrst period, CRS
coverage is only 30%. We thus proceed with some additional
robustness checks for Regression (4).
First, we shorten the period of analysis to the years 2002–2010,
for which data coverage is much more complete. However, any
structural panel leaving some time for enrolments to adjust to the
inﬂow of new funding is then restricted to two periods at best. In
this context we do not ﬁnd any signiﬁcant effect any more.
Second, we keep the three periods of analysis as before, but
inﬂate EDUCAID in the ﬁrst period using the relationship between
overall aid disbursements from the DAC statistics, and the sum of
disbursements by sector as reported by the CRS. Coverage for
overall aid disbursements was 30% for period one in our sample
(1996–2000), 80% for period two (2001–2005), and close to 100%
for period three (2006–2010). Assuming that relative under-
reporting is the same across sectors and countries, we thus
multiply EDUCAID by 10/3 in the ﬁrst period, and by 10/8 in the
second CRS (for details on this approach, see also Michaelowa and
Weber, 2007, p. 4). This hardly changes any of our results, and
EDUCAID is signiﬁcant as before.5
We conclude that the results of Regression (4) in Table 1 do not
reﬂect a spurious correlation related to improved reporting to the
CRS, but the actual effect of education aid on primary school
enrolment. Yet, as the general discussion has shown, the signiﬁcance
of this effect is not robust to variations in regression speciﬁcation,
and notably to variations in sample size. This may be related to
the fact that the time period with comprehensive and reliable
sector speciﬁc disbursement data is still very short (2002–2010).
Another more substantive reason for the relatively low level of
precision could be that we have so far looked at total education aid,
rather than at aid speciﬁcally directed toward primary education.
This will be examined in the next section.
4. Aid for different educational purposes and their effect on
primary enrolment
While donors have committed themselves to the MDGs and the
Dakar Framework of Action, in practice, they may still have
prioritized categories of education aid that do not directly affect
the primary or basic level of education. This is one source of
inefﬁciency already suggested by Michaelowa and Weber (2007),
and by Christensen et al. (2010) who argue that other education
spending may even negatively affect primary enrolment.
Fig. 2 shows the development of education disbursements since
the mid-1990s, for all sub-categories listed in the OECD’s CRS.
While many areas have received a substantial increase in funding
especially since the year 2000, i.e., after the Dakar Conference,
tertiary rather than primary education clearly dominates. Primary
education comes second, but donor support for tertiary education
is almost 50% higher. Obviously, the cost for both teachers and
equipment are much higher at tertiary level, but nevertheless,
given that the declared objectives strongly focus on the primary
level, this is a somewhat surprising result. It is in line with the
ﬁndings by Thiele et al. (2007) who ﬁnd that education aid lacks
a clear focus on the priorities of the MDGs.
At the same time, the category ‘primary education’ does not
seem to encompass total ﬁnancial support to this level of
education. The categories ‘education facilities and training’ as
well as ‘teacher training’, may in fact be largely targeted at the5 Results not shown here but available from the authors upon request.
Fig. 2. Aid for education by sub-sectorial purpose. Notes: As described in the notes to Fig. 1, data until 2001 may suffer from signiﬁcant underreporting by DAC donors, and data
for the very last year (2010) might also not be fully complete.
Source: OECD (2012).
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the building of new schools, this interpretation appears rather
plausible. Adding these categories to primary education puts the
relationship to tertiary education in a different perspective.
Secondary education has beneﬁtted much less from the recent
rise in education aid. The line is hidden among many other lines in
the lower part of Fig. 2. Between primary education that has
attracted donors’ support due to the direct link with poverty
reduction and empowerment, and tertiary education that may be
of direct interest to the donors (creating ties with future leaders of
the country), the secondary level seems to have been somewhat
neglected. Yet, with strongly rising primary enrolment rates, this
level might become the future bottleneck.
Relatively large amounts have been spent on vocational
training and on the support of education policy-making and
administrative management. For each, disbursements have been
about twice as much as for secondary education.
Obviously, even those areas without a direct link to primary
enrolment, may have an indirect effect. A well-functioning
secondary (or even tertiary) education system can enhance
students’ incentives to complete primary school. In principle, this
could also be true for other complementary areas of education such
as vocational and technical training if this is considered as
sufﬁciently attractive by the targeted youths. Another comple-
mentary area could be early childhood education. A number of
studies have established a link between pre-primary education
and the ability to cope well during later years of schooling, a
consequence that simultaneously tends to reduce drop-out rates
(UNESCO, 2007, p. 17). In addition, a sound university system may
be beneﬁcial for primary education through the training of good
teachers. However, this is a rather long-term perspective since in
many poor developing countries only a minority of primary school
teachers attends university.6 A similar long-term perspective is6 See data collected by the Program d’analyse des syste`mes e´ducatifs de la
CONFEMEN (PASEC, see: http://www.confemen.org/le-pasec) or by the The
Southern and Eastern Africa Consortium for Monitoring of Educational Quality
(SACMEQ, see: http://www.sacmeq.org).presumably required to see the effect of educational research. We
can thus not expect that these variables become signiﬁcant within
the short time frame we consider here.
Table 2 tests the effect of each of the available education aid
sub-categories on direct or indirect effects on enrolment that may
appear within the ﬁve-year period considered (Regressions (1)–
(11)). The regression model used is the same as the one applied to
overall education aid in Table 1, Regression (4). Again, all aid
variables are expressed in per capita terms. Moreover, just as most
of the control variables, they are entered as logs (see the notes
under Table 2).
Due to strong multicollinearity, the individual sub-categories of
education aid cannot be considered jointly. At the same time, there
is also a risk in interpreting them individually as the coefﬁcients
may simply reﬂect the effect of other, omitted categories. In
addition to the regressions with individual sub-categories, we thus
carried out various regressions testing different combinations of
these variables. Two of these regressions are presented in Table 2
as Regression (12) and (13). Regression (12) includes all categories
that were signiﬁcant individually in Regressions (1)–(11). Regres-
sion (13) replicates Regression (12), but leaves out tertiary
education which has the highest variance inﬂation factor (VIF)
among the different categories.
The variables that turn out to be positively signiﬁcant
individually are: primary education, education facilities and
training, teacher training, basic skills, and tertiary education.
The results for the ﬁrst three of these conﬁrm the above
expectations that all these categories are directly relevant for
primary education. As increased enrolment requires more
teachers, the latter have often been trained in special fast-track
programs, the duration of which was often less than a year. The
visibility of an effect within a ﬁve-year framework is thus generally
plausible.
The effect of disbursements for basic life skills (focusing on
youth and adults) is less straight forward. One could even see such
programs as competing with rather than supporting primary
enrolment. And even more surprising is the signiﬁcant and high
coefﬁcient for tertiary education. However, none of these remains
Table 2
The effect of education aid for different purposes on primary school enrolment.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15)
Disbursements for speciﬁc purposes, per capita (in logs)
Primary education 1.71* 0.41 0.80 2.63**
(0.07) (0.63) (0.34) (0.01)
Policy & Admin 1.83
(0.59)
Facilities & training 2.66*** 1.45 1.80** 2.61**
(0.00) (0.11) (0.05) (0.04)
Teacher training 1.42** 0.91 0.87 1.09
(0.04) (0.20) (0.21) (0.16)
Educational research 0.41
(0.23)
Basic skills 1.15** 0.69 0.86
(0.03) (0.25) (0.11)
Early childhood 0.35
(0.51)
Secondary education 1.07 1.78*
(0.18) (0.08)
Vocational training 0.23
(0.81)
Tertiary education 6.66** 3.05
(0.02) (0.39)
Advanced technical
training
5.25
(0.35)
Facilities and training 
teacher training
0.06
(0.55)
Primary education 
secondary education
0.23**
(0.01)
Control variables (in logs, except BUDGET and FREE)
EDUCEXP 7.17 7.13 7.15 7.97 6.89 6.97 5.84 8.05 6.52 8.35 7.73 8.89 8.31 7.66 7.70
(0.46) (0.46) (0.46) (0.41) (0.48) (0.47) (0.56) (0.40) (0.51) (0.39) (0.44) (0.35) (0.38) (0.43) (0.41)
PRT 9.71 9.02 4.31 8.92 11.20 9.76 9.02 7.50 9.71 10.74 6.90 7.29 6.14 5.69 12.41
(0.56) (0.59) (0.80) (0.60) (0.48) (0.55) (0.59) (0.65) (0.56) (0.51) (0.66) (0.67) (0.71) (0.74) (0.46)
YOUNG POP 55.71 60.43 57.68 51.37 62.76* 46.42 62.18* 62.98* 64.54* 48.86 61.12* 34.25 36.22 50.02 55.92
(0.13) (0.11) (0.13) (0.16) (0.09) (0.21) (0.09) (0.08) (0.10) (0.19) (0.10) (0.35) (0.32) (0.18) (0.12)
GDP per capita 4.50 5.59 4.92 4.91 8.12 6.00 6.26 3.93 5.67 5.48 3.06 5.23 5.03 4.97 7.24
(0.70) (0.64) (0.68) (0.68) (0.47) (0.60) (0.61) (0.73) (0.64) (0.64) (0.79) (0.66) (0.66) (0.67) (0.55)
BUDGET (surplus) 1.45** 1.59*** 1.90*** 1.84*** 1.74*** 1.56*** 1.66**** 1.41** 1.65*** 1.56**** 1.66*** 1.77*** 1.78*** 1.99*** 1.47***
(0.02) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01)
INFLATION 7.54*** 6.63** 6.84** 7.60*** 6.43** 7.22** 6.86** 6.65** 6.87** 6.43** 7.14** 7.54** 7.93*** 7.15** 6.71**
(0.01) (0.03) (0.02) (0.01) (0.03) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.03)
OPEN 2.46 2.76 1.95 4.70 3.42 0.18 1.85 1.08 2.26 3.60 0.99 2.65 1.62 3.38 4.32
(0.86) (0.85) (0.89) (0.73) (0.80) (0.99) (0.89) (0.94) (0.87) (0.79) (0.95) (0.84) (0.90) (0.80) (0.76)
FREE 11.40*** 11.17** 10.96** 9.96** 11.43*** 11.98*** 11.20** 11.26** 11.30** 10.26** 11.87*** 10.25** 10.85** 10.13** 10.98**
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01)
Observations 257 257 257 257 257 257 257 257 257 257 257 257 257 257 257
Countries 110 110 110 110 110 110 110 110 110 110 110 110 110 110 110
R2 (within) 0.32 0.31 0.34 0.33 0.31 0.32 0.31 0.32 0.31 0.33 0.31 0.36 0.36 0.35 0.34
Source: See Appendix, Table A1.
Notes: The dependent variable for all regressions is the same as in Table 1, Regression (4), i.e., the growth of net enrolment rates over the previous ﬁve-year period (in%). All
right-hand-side variables except BUDGET (because of numerous negative values and FREE (which is a categorical variable) are in logs). As many purpose codes include 0-
values, we added 0.000001 to all values for aid by purpose code before taking logs. In all cases ln(0.000001) is below the minimum value the variable takes otherwise. As sub-
categories of the overall EDUCAID per capita variable, all individual aid disbursement variables are equally measured in per capita terms (before taking the logs for this
regression). Country and period ﬁxed effects, and missing value indicators for imputed variables are included but not shown. Robust p-values in parentheses.
* Signiﬁcance at the 10% level.
** Signiﬁcance at the 5% level.
*** Signiﬁcance at the 1% level.
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equation. When all signiﬁcant variables are included jointly in
Regression (12), only the facilities and training variable still
comes close to signiﬁcance at the 10% level. As indicated by the
VIF, tertiary education is so highly correlated to other disburse-
ment categories that its coefﬁcient appears difﬁcult to interpret.
While there may be some positive effect, it is certainly largely
overestimated in Regression (10). When excluding it from the
regression, education facilities and training again become clearly
signiﬁcant, and disbursements for basic life skills almost recover
signiﬁcance at the 10% level (cf. Regression (13)). Perhaps one
could imagine that the basic skills training for youth and adultscan complement the children’s enrolment by strengthening the
focus on education in general, and by enhancing the chances
of written communication or reading within the family or
neighborhood.
While Findley et al. (2009) as well as Christensen et al. (2010)
suggest that some aid sub-categories may also show negative
effects, we do not ﬁnd any signiﬁcant negative coefﬁcients.
However, both vocational training and advanced technical training
show an insigniﬁcant negative sign. This reduces the plausibility
that these types of programs might increase the incentive for a
sound elementary education at primary school. Indeed, in most
developing countries, going to school is linked to aspirations of a
Fig. 3. Interaction effects (Table 2, Regressions 14 and 15). Notes: Dashed lines show the 90% conﬁdence interval. All aid variables are in logs.
Source: See Appendix, Table A1.
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technical work, is relatively low.
This is also consistent with the frequent evidence for
developing (as opposed to industrialized) countries that educated
youth tend to be unemployed more often than their uneducated
peers (Michaelowa and Waller, 2003). Thus while these trainings
may be very valuable by themselves, they do not seem to positively
inﬂuence primary enrolment.
In a ﬁnal step, we directly examine potential complementarities
between individual aid categories. First, we expect that there may
be some mutually reinforcing effect of the different types of aid
directly focused on primary education, namely between the
construction and equipment of schools on the one hand, and
teacher training on the other hand. Second, we hypothesize that
the prospects after primary school affect the incentive to attend
and complete primary education in the ﬁrst place. If the prospects
of entering a vocational career do not appear to have any positive
effect, students may aspire to further education. Since the
immediate step after primary education is secondary education,
we examine whether support for primary and secondary education
may be mutually reinforcing. The interaction of aid for facilities
and teacher training is examined in Regression (14), the interaction
of aid for primary and secondary education in Regression (15). The
results are further illustrated in Fig. 3.
In the ﬁrst case (Regression (14), upper panel of Fig. 3), the
direction of the effect is as expected, but the interaction is not
signiﬁcant. On the Figure to the left, one can make out that the
marginal effect of aid for teacher training is very small and fully
insigniﬁcant for small values of aid ﬂowing into facilities while it
gets much closer to signiﬁcance when the facility variable
increases and approaches its median. In other words, when
moving from left to right on the x-axis toward the median of log(aid for facilities and training), the lower bound of the conﬁdence
interval (dashed line) is approaching zero from below. In contrast,
facilities and training is always signiﬁcant for primary enrolment,
no matter what the amount spent on teacher training (upper panel,
ﬁgure to the right).
One problem with this analysis may be the difﬁculty to clearly
distinguish the facilities and equipment category from the teacher
training category. The former, too, includes some training
activities, which may make it difﬁcult to observe potential
complementarities in our data. The detailed OECD/DAC descrip-
tions of the sub-sectors (cf. Table A1) do not provide much more
insights on this aspect.
The lower panel of Fig. 3 and Regression (15) show the
interaction between primary and secondary education aid. In this
case, the interaction term is strongly and positively signiﬁcant.
This conﬁrms our hypothesis on the complementarity of these two
sub-sectors. The graph on the left hand side reveals that aid for
primary education turns signiﬁcant only when secondary educa-
tion is also supported at least to a certain extent. At the same time,
aid for secondary education shows itself a signiﬁcant effect on
primary enrolment if primary education simultaneously receives
sufﬁcient support. This provides some plausibility to our argument
regarding the incentives related to further prospects within the
education system.
5. Considering the quantity–quality nexus
While aid for education, in particular the support of facilities
and training, and useful combinations of primary and secondary
education, appear to be beneﬁcial for primary enrolment, other
policies may be necessary to ensure an improvement of education
quality. In fact, in many countries, strong growth of enrolment has
Table 3
Student reading achievement in Southern and Eastern Africa, national averages.
Country SACMEQ I
1995
SACMEQ II
2003
SACMEQ III
2007
Botswana 521.1 (3.47) 534.6 (4.57)
Kenya 543.3 (4.53) 546.5 (4.96) 543.1 (4.92)
Lesotho 451.5 (2.92) 467.9 (2.86)
Malawi 462.6 (2.42) 428.9 (2.37) 433.5 (2.63)
Mauritius 550.2 (5.26) 536.4 (5.49) 573.5 (4.92)
Mozambique 516.7 (2.29) 476.0 (2.82)
Namibia 472.9 (4.65) 449.0 (3.12) 496.9 (2.99)
South Africa 492.4 (8.98) 494.9 (4.55)
Swaziland 529.6 (3.73) 549.4 (2.98)
Tanzania 545.9 (5.03) 577.8 (3.40)
Uganda 482.4 (6.12) 478.7 (3.46)
Source: SACMEQ (2012).
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. Reading scores are also available for:
Seychelles (2007) = 575.1 (3.10), Zambia (2007) = 434.4 (3.37), Zimbabwe
(2007) = 507.7 (5.65). However, since these countries only participated in one
SAQMEC panel, they are excluded from our analysis. Mathematics scores also exist
for most countries, but the international coverage of reading scores is better, so that
we focus on the latter. Achievement scores for both subjects are strongly correlated.
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for instance, which introduced free primary education in 1994,
immediately experienced a dramatic increase in enrolment rates
without any preparation of the education system for this rush of
new students. Expanding facilities, training and engaging new
teachers, and providing textbooks and other pedagogical material
were not able to keep pace with this development (Chimombo
et al., 2005; World Bank, 2004). A similar situation was faced by
Mozambique and, albeit to a lesser extent, by Kenya in the mid-
2000s. In all three cases, signiﬁcant improvements in enrolment
were accompanied by declining or stagnating national reading
scores (see Table 3). Similar evidence is also available for large
parts of Western Africa, where primary enrolment often more than
doubled within a decade (see, e.g., CONFEMEN, 2009 for Burkina
Faso). CONFEMEN (2009, p. 35) also shows that the decline in
average test scores is, to a large extent, simply driven by changes in
the student population, since children with less favorable socio-
economic backgrounds have been integrated into the education
system. For countries with important improvements in enrolment
rates, raising or even simply maintaining education quality is thus
a considerable challenge.
International donors have substantially supported such coun-
tries in building up the necessary physical and human resources.
However, they have also put pressure on many governments to
reduce teacher salaries and training requirements for access to the
teaching profession, and to accept relatively high PTRs in order to
be able to enroll more students (see, e.g., the benchmarks of
the Education for All – Fast Track Initiative (EFA-FTI) (EFA-FTI
Secretariat, 2006; MINEDAF, 2002)). From this perspective, some
might argue that donors may have focused on quantity to the
detriment of quality.
At the same time, a number of aid activities have been primarily
focusing on education quality, and will not be duly acknowledged
if we look at aid effectiveness in the education sector from a purely
quantity oriented perspective. Support of teacher training, for
instance, might be vastly underestimated in its effect if we
measure outcomes only in terms of student enrolment. In the
context of EFA-FTI the whole system of teacher education has
been thoroughly reformed in many African countries. Moreover,
new primary education curricula have been derived and supple-
mented by new teaching material. These are just a few examples.
To obtain a complete picture of the aid effectiveness in the
education sector, we thus need to take into account developments
in education quality. For this purpose, we consider a smaller
sample of countries for which the SACMEQ program provides
comparable student achievement data across countries and over
time. SACMEQ is a consortium of 15 education ministries in
Southern and Eastern Africa that evaluates the conditions of
schooling and the quality of education, with technical assistance
from the UNESCO International Institute for Educational Planning
(IIEP). The focus is on monitoring student achievement toward the
end of primary education (grade 6). Participants are selected
through random sampling with a typical sample size of 2000–5000
pupils per country.7 All scores for the second wave of the program
(SACMEQ II) were standardized at an international mean of 500,
and values for all other waves were adjusted accordingly. Table 3
presents average national reading scores.
As the sample at the country level is relatively small, our
analysis cannot go beyond simple qualitative comparisons which,
however, may still provide us with some relevant insights. We start
by sorting the observations into four different categories: Group A7 Note that there are signiﬁcant differences in country size which are reﬂected in
sample size. Moreover, sample size (and thus precision) seems to have increased
over time. During the third wave (SACMEQ III), the average number of students
assessed was >4000.includes all fully successful country-cases, i.e., countries that
managed to increase both enrolment and achievement in the
period considered. Group B contains those cases that reached
higher enrolment, but no improvement of student achievement.
Group C covers those countries that succeeded in increasing
achievement, but not enrolment. And ﬁnally, Group D contains
cases with no improvement on either side. These groups are listed
in Fig. 4 along with the allocation of education aid (shares of total
education aid) to the different sub-sectorial categories.
When looking at the combination of countries in each of these
groups, it becomes clear that for both groups with no improvement
in quantity, educational coverage was quite high right from the
beginning. Except for Lesotho, in all cases net enrolment rates were
beyond 80% to start with. As discussed earlier, this makes it
relatively hard to obtain further improvements on this dimension.
It is not directly clear, however, why some of these countries
managed to obtain improvements in quality while others did not
(and even showed signiﬁcant reductions in achievement scores).
However, for both Mauritius and Namibia, we observe an
improvement over time as they moved from Group D to Group
C between the ﬁrst and the second period included in the analysis.
Group B comprises the three countries Kenya, Malawi, and
Mozambique already discussed above. Their initial enrolment
levels were lower, and they succeeded in considerable improve-
ments on this dimension while achievement scores stagnated
(Kenya) or signiﬁcantly decreased (Malawi, Mozambique). For
Malawi, however, this represents only the ﬁrst phase of the
educational expansion process. During the time of rapid increases
in educational coverage, the country did not manage to keep up
with educational quality, but improvements on the quality
dimension were made in the second stage where we ﬁnd the
country in Group C. Kenya, in contrast, managed to improve both
quantity and quality during the ﬁrst period (Group A), but falls
back to Group B in the second period with no further improve-
ments of student achievement. In addition to Kenya, Group A
contains Botswana, Swaziland, and Tanzania.
In the following paragraphs, we will try to examine patterns of
aid distribution that may be related to the placement of the
observation in either of these groups. First, we notice that there is
no apparent link with the overall allocation of aid to the education
sector in the respective countries (EDUCAID denotes the annual
average disbursements per capita during the relevant period). In
fact, except for Botswana, the very successful countries of Group A
receive relatively little aid overall. In addition, there is no obvious
dominance of any individual aid category in Group A.
Fig. 4. Education aid by purpose for different groups of SACMEQ countries. Notes: Data refer to annual averages over the respective period, whereby we consider two periods of
equal length (four years). While the difference in SACMEQ scores effectively refers to 1995–2003, rather than 2000–2003, for the ﬁrst period, we assume that this does not
change the general direction of the quality effect, i.e., the inclusion in the groups.
Source: OECD (2012).
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education aid seems to dominate the other aid categories. The most
surprising case may be Kenya which received less primary
education aid and more tertiary education aid during the phase
in which primary achievement grew along with enrolment (2000–
2003). Other educational funding remained relatively stable. It
appears plausible to assume that primary education aid may have
gone essentially into building school infrastructure and that this
does not have a strong effect on education quality (at least after
some of the most basic requirements are met).
At least at ﬁrst glance, Fig. 4 suggests that quality improve-
ments require a somewhat more equal distribution of funding
across different areas. In other words, despite our interest in
primary education outcomes, it may be relevant for aid not to focus
on primary education alone, but to also cover other areas of
education (like secondary education, tertiary education, vocational
training, or education policy and administrative management) in a
well-balanced way. Indeed as discussed in Section 4 with respect
to student enrolment, for achievement, too, there may be
important complementarities between the different areas. In
analogy to what we discussed earlier, there may, for instance, be a
certain incentive effect of further education prospects in a
functioning secondary and tertiary education system.
We make use of these ideas in the framework of a more
systematic comparative analysis using QCA, a method developed
by Charles Ragin (1989) to combine the precise discussion of
individual cases with a formalized tool that can be applied to a
small number of observations. QCA uses Boolean algebra to
establish necessary and/or sufﬁcient conditions for certain out-
comes. A detailed description of the statistical methodology of QCA
is offered by Longest and Vaisey (2008). We use the most basic
approach here in order to get around a lengthy introduction into
this methodology and its speciﬁc terminology, and only present a
short summary of the relevant parts of this framework.8
QCA evaluates the relationship between an outcome and any
possible Boolean combination of prediction variables. In the
simplest version of the method applied here, all of these are binary
variables. Let us suppose that we want to explain a certain outcome
Y (e.g., success = 1, 0 otherwise) with predictors A and B. QCA now
examines which combinations of A and B produce the outcome.
The predictor sets (A, B) can have four different conﬁgurations:
both factors present, one factor present, the other factor present,
both factors absent. The value 0 tells us that a factor was absent
while 1 indicates that a factor was present. If the same combination
of factors leads to opposing (or inconsistent) outcomes the
corresponding cases are uninformative and cannot be used for
the analysis. All other cases are explored to determine the relevant
empirical patterns.
We are interested in establishing which combination of factors
allows countries to (I) enhance the quality of their primary
education, or, ideally, (II) improve both quality and coverage
simultaneously. The above discussion leads us to consider that this
may depend on three main factors. Regarding aid, we ﬁrst
conjecture that there should be a relatively equal spread between
different aid activities, notably between those directly related to
primary education and those related to higher levels of education.
We thus construct a dummy variable that takes the value of one if
these shares are approximately equal, and zero otherwise. For aid
directly related to primary education, we add the amounts for the
sub-categories ‘primary education’, ‘facilities and training’, and
‘teacher training’. For higher levels of education we add aid for
‘secondary education’ and aid for ‘tertiary education’. We further8 For details on this technique see Ragin (2000, 2006), Rihoux and Ragin (2009),
Klu¨ver (2010), and Longest and Vaisey (2008) who also programmed a
corresponding Stata device.allow a deviation of up to 10% and still consider these shares as
equal. This is a suitable choice because it separates relatively well
between different spending patterns as no country is very close to
this particular cut-off. In other words, varying the cut-off by using
5% or 15% instead does not change the country classiﬁcation. This
implies that results do not depend on small changes in the cut-off.
Second, we assume that countries already enjoying a high
enrolment rate to begin with, will face more difﬁculties to improve
further on the quantity dimension (or, in some cases, will not even
require any improvements any more, since they have already
achieved universal primary education). Just as in the context of the
quantitative regression analysis, we draw the line at a NER of 80%.
This splits the observations into two about equal-sized groups, and
is also relatively robust to small changes (Botswana, with an initial
enrolment of 83% in 2003, comes closest to the cut-off point.)
Third, we examine overall education aid per capita disbursed to
the different countries. While the initial impression from Fig. 4 did
not suggest any direct link, the combination with either of the two
variables mentioned above may change the picture. Notably, a
clearer picture might emerge once those countries with already
well-developed primary education coverage (and thus a some-
times strong focus of aid on tertiary education) are excluded. We
again construct a dummy variable whereby all country-cases with
disbursements above the median are considered as observations
with high aid.
Table 4 lists all eight possible combinations of values for the
three different explanatory variables considered, together with the
number of observations for each combination and the observed
outcome of the alternative dependent variables (I) and (II).
Note that there are situations in which different country-cases
with identical combinations of values for the ‘Equal shares’,
‘NER  80%’, and ‘EDUCAID  median’ variables yield different
outcomes. As explained above, in these cases, the patterns do not
lead to consistent results and must therefore be excluded from
further analysis.
All consistent combinations are examined with respect to the
possibility of logical simpliﬁcation. We ﬁrst consider the depen-
dent variable ‘quality improvement’ (Group A or Group C). In this
context, we have four combinations leading to the consistent
outcome ‘quality improvement’ = 1. These combinations can be
reduced as follows:9
ð5Þ 100 þ ð6Þ 101 : ! 10
ð7Þ 110 þ ð8Þ 111 : ! 11
10 þ 11 : ! 1
In other words, comparing line (5) and line (6) from the above
truth table implies that for equal shares (factor 1 = 1) and low NER
(factor 2 = 0), the positive outcome does not depend on the aid
volume (factor 3). In addition, comparing (7) and (8) implies that
for equal shares and high NER, the positive outcome does not
depend on the aid volume either. From this ﬁrst step, we thus
conclude that all combinations with equal shares and low NER as
well as all combinations with equal shares and high NER are
associated with improvements in quality. This in turn implies that
for equal shares, the positive outcome does not depend on NER
either. This second reduction leads us to conclude that in our9 To correctly interpret this and the following lines, note that ‘(5) 100’ indicates
that we copy the combination of factors as indicated in Table 4, line 5: the ﬁrst factor
is present (1), the second and third are not present (0). Taking lines (5) and (6)
together further indicates that the presence of the third factor is not relevant for the
outcome. This is indicated by the dot in the reduced form (! 10).
Table 4
QCA truth table.
Possible combinations Equal shares NER  80% EDUCAID per
capita  median
Number of
cases
(I) Quality improvement
(yes = 1, no = 0)
(II) Group A
(yes = 1, no = 0)
(1) 0 0 0 2 Inconsistent Inconsistent
(2) 0 0 1 1 0 0
(3) 0 1 0 3 Inconsistent Inconsistent
(4) 0 1 1 4 Inconsistent 0
(5) 1 0 0 1 1 1
(6) 1 0 1 1 1 0
(7) 1 1 0 1 1 0
(8) 1 1 1 2 1 Inconsistent
Sources: OECD (2012) and SACMEQ (2012).
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on primary (including facilities, training, and teacher training) and
higher levels of education is a sufﬁcient condition for combined
improvements in primary education quality and quantity.
For ‘quality improvement’ = 0, we have only one consistent
combination, so that no further reduction is possible. This
combination shows that at low initial enrolment and with an
unequal distribution of aid across educational sub-sectors, high aid
fails to enhance education quality. Clearly, once the educational
coverage is satisfactorily dealt with, chances for (aid supported)
quality improvements are higher (cf. the Malawi case discussed
above).
We now consider the second dependent variable, i.e., our
dummy for combined improvement of quantity and quality
(membership in Group A). This time, we only have one
combination leading to a consistent positive outcome, namely
the combination of equal shares, low initial NER, and low aid.
However, we have four combinations yielding consistent
negative results. They can be reduced as follows:
ð2Þ 001 þ ð4Þ 011 : ! 01
ð2Þ 001 þ ð6Þ 101 : !01
This implies that in our setting, high aid in combination with
unequal shares is a sufﬁcient condition for not reaching combined
improvements of education quality and coverage (no matter the
initial level of NER). Moreover, at equally high aid, when the NER
is low to start with, the joint improvement (as opposed to the
quality improvement alone) is not reached, even if disbursements
are allocated evenly.
All in all, QCA does not suggest that the amount of total aid
for education has played a relevant role for raising education
quality. The distribution of aid, however, appears to be
important. Nevertheless, it cannot guarantee the simultaneous
growth in quantity and quality which appears to be a major
challenge.
6. Conclusions
Overall, our results suggest that with respect to enhancing
primary education outcomes, aid has been more relevant for
improved enrolment (education quantity) than for increased
achievement (education quality). Based on the most recent OECD
sectoral disbursement data and a regression speciﬁcation compa-
rable to the preferred speciﬁcation in the growth model elaborated
by Clemens et al. (2012), we ﬁnd that an increase of education aid
by 1% increases the growth rate of primary enrolment by about
0.06 percentage points (or very roughly, a doubling of aid leads to
an increase by 6 percentage points). This result is relativelymodest, but non-negligible. When considering that donors have
indeed tremendously increased their disbursements on aid in
recent years, they can claim that a sizeable share of the progress
toward universal primary education (and MDGs) is due to their
ﬁnancial support. Some caution is necessary, however, when
interpreting these results because only since 2002 donor reporting
of disbursements is reasonably comprehensive. Possibly related to
this problem, the statistical signiﬁcance of the effect of education
aid is not robust to variations in the econometric speciﬁcation, and
notably in sample size.
When breaking down overall education aid according into
individual DAC purpose codes, it appears that the observed
positive effect is driven mainly by those sub-categories that are
directly related to primary education. The most robust effect on
primary enrolment is obtained by aid in the category ‘education
facilities and training’. In addition, there is evidence for com-
plementarities between aid for primary and secondary education.
The positive and signiﬁcant interaction term implies that support
for these different levels of education has a mutually reinforcing
effect. If primary education obtains sufﬁcient ﬁnancial support,
simultaneously supporting secondary education further increases
primary enrolment. This may be due to an incentive effect that
induces children to complete primary schooling if they see the
prospects to continue at secondary level later.
Our QCA also shows the importance of the right balance
between primary and higher levels of education, this time with
respect to the improvement of primary education quality. The
prospects of further education do not only seem to induce students
to complete primary education but also to increase their learning
effort.
Given the relatively low volume of aid currently invested in
secondary education (both relative to the primary and to the
tertiary level), a natural policy conclusion could be to focus more
strongly on this sub-sector in the future. This is well in line with the
broadened educational goal of the SDGs as compared to the more
narrow perspective of the earlier MDGs. However, one might also
need to consider the long-term dynamics here: providing
attractive opportunities for studies at an always higher level of
education will lead to a dead end at some point as long as graduates
do not ﬁnd appropriate jobs. In the long run, developing the labor
market may thus be the most important complement to any
support for the education sector. While the 2030 Agenda for
Sustainable Development considers a wide range of complemen-
tarities between the multiple SDGs, the private sector and labor
markets in developing countries might have deserved some more
attention in this regard.
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Variable deﬁnitions, sources, and descriptive statistics.
Variable name Deﬁnition Sources Observationsa Mean Std.
deviation
Min Max
NER Net enrolment rate for primary
education (%)
WDI (World Bank, 2012) 501 82.46 16.62 23.02 100
EDUCAID per capita Aid per capita allocated to education
(disbursement, constant 2000 US$)/
population
OECD (2012), Creditor
Reporting System (CRS)2
608 31.25 72.13 0 855.47
Sub-categories Aid per capita allocated to speciﬁc
educational purposes
(disbursement, constant 2000 US$)/
population
OECD (2012), Creditor
Reporting System (CRS)2
- Policy & Admin Education sector policy, planning
and programs; aid to education
ministries, administration and
management systems; institution
capacity building and advice; school
management and governance;
curriculum and materials
development; unspeciﬁed
education activities
608 4.26 9.40 0 99.58
- Facilities & Training Educational buildings, equipment,
materials; subsidiary services to
education (boarding facilities, staff
housing); language training;
colloquia, seminars, lectures, etc.
608 3.08 7.49 0 72.05
- Teacher training Teacher education (where the level
of education is unspeciﬁed); in-
service and pre-service training;
materials development
608 1.03 2.69 0 34.52
- Educational research Research and studies on education
effectiveness, relevance and quality;
systematic evaluation and
monitoring
608 0.22 0.69 0 7.66
- Primary education Formal and non-formal primary
education for children; all
elementary and ﬁrst cycle
systematic instruction; provision of
learning materials.
608 5.33 14.12 0 143.75
- Basic skills Formal and non-formal education
for basic life skills for young people
and adults (adults’ education);
literacy and numeracy training
608 1.45 4.14 0 45.59
- Early childhood Formal and non-formal pre-school
education
608 0.82 2.80 0 35.67
- Secondary education Second cycle systematic instruction
at both junior and senior levels
608 1.39 3.42 0 40.22
- Vocational training Elementary vocational training and
secondary level technical education;
on-the job training;
apprenticeships; including informal
vocational training.0
608 3.38 8.57 0 85.89
- Tertiary education Degree and diploma programs at
universities, colleges and
polytechnics; scholarships
608 8.82 23.48 0 386.72
- Advanced technical
training
Professional-level vocational
training programs and in-service
training
608 1.47 4.24 0 58.51
EDUCEXP Public spending on education (% of
government expenditure)
WDI (World Bank, 2012) 596 15.77 4.75 -42.03 32.78
PTR Pupil–teacher ratio in primary
education
WDI (World Bank, 2012) 596 30.48 13.10 3.95 90.65
YOUNG POP Population aged 0–14 (% of total
population)
WDI (World Bank, 2012) 596 35.36 8.60 13.94 51.86
GDP per capita GDP per capita (constant 2000 US$) WDI (World Bank, 2012) 596 6266.75 7076.99 172.60 48894.64
BUDGET (surplus) Cash surplus/deﬁcit (% of GDP) WDI (World Bank, 2012) 596 -1.71 4.24 -64.94 35.14
INFLATION Inﬂation (consumer prices,% annual) WDI (World Bank, 2012) 596 47.99 313.24 -6.90 6517.11
OPEN Openness (export + import in% of
GDP)
WDI (World Bank, 2012) 596 84.21 43.14 0.56 422.00
FREE Freedom House (mean of political
rights and civil liberties; lowest
freedom = 7, highest = 1)
Freedom House (2011) 596 3.97 1.80 1 7
a Notes: Descriptive statistics refer to the full sample as used in the Appendix, Tables A2 and A4.
Table A2
Replication of Michaelowa and Weber (2007, Table 1) with new disbursement data.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Method Arellano&Bond Arellano&Bond,
robust
Blundel&Bond,
robust
Blundell&Bond,
robust
Blundell&Bond, robust;
additional IV: ENERGYAID
Variables considered endogeneous L.NER
EDUCAID
L.NER
EDUCAID
L:NER
EDUCAID
L.NER
EDUCAID
EXPEDUC
L.NER
EDUCAID
Dependent variable NER (%) NER (%) NER (%) NER (%) NER (%)
L.NER 0.38 0.19 0.48* 0.39** 0.45**
(0.51) (0.66) (0.08) (0.02) (0.02)
EDUCAID per capita 0.05 0.05 0.03 0.04** 0.05*
(0.25) (0.21) (0.19) (0.01) (0.07)
EDUCEXP 0.89 0.32 0.14 0.29 0.06
(0.25) (0.11) (0.35) (0.42) (0.67)
PTR 0.07 0.14 0.23 0.32*** 0.27***
(0.77) (0.44) (0.11) (0.00) (0.00)
YOUNG POP 1.67 0.74** 0.07 0.07 0.06
(0.13) (0.04) (0.69) (0.68) (0.72)
GDP per capita 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
(0.26) (0.28) (0.71) (0.55) (0.47)
BUDGET (surplus) 0.16 0.02 0.24 0.29 0.31
(0.65) (0.95) (0.29) (0.19) (0.16)
INFLATION 0.39 0.03 0.02* 0.03** 0.02**
(0.44) (0.71) (0.07) (0.03) (0.04)
OPEN 0.00 0.09 0.02 0.03 0.03
(0.97) (0.12) (0.57) (0.19) (0.25)
FREE 2.19 1.59 0.89 1.08** 1.28***
(0.37) (0.52) (0.11) (0.02) (0.01)
Observations 178 178 309 309 304
Countries 105 105 131 131 129
Wald chi2(17) = 1.2e + 06 chi2(17) = 860872 chi2(18) = 1416 chi2(18) = 895.1 chi2(18) = 681.5
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Hansen chi2(2) = 1.70 chi2(4) = 3.21 chi2(4) = 4.10 chi2(6) = 4.74 chi2(2) = 1.99
(0.43) (0.53) (0.39) (0.59) (0.37)
AR1 z = 0.583 z = 0.364 z = 1.221 z = 1.154 z = 1.788
(0.56) (0.72) (0.22) (0.25) (0.07)
AR2 . . . . .
Instruments 19 21 23 25 21
Source: See Appendix, Table A1.
Notes: Missing value indicators for imputed variables are included as controls but not shown. The preﬁx ‘L.’ denotes a lagged variable. p-values in parentheses.
* Signiﬁcance at the 10% level.
** Signiﬁcance at the 5% level.
*** Signiﬁcance at the 1% level.
Table A3
Replication of Michaelowa and Weber (2007, Table 1 new data), initial NER < 80%.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Method Arellano&Bond Arellano & Bond,
robust
Blundel & Bond,
robust
Blundell & Bond,
robust
Blundell&Bond, robust;
additional IV: ENERGYAID
Variables considered endogeneous L.NER
EDUCAID
NER (%)
L.NER
EDUCAID
L:NER
EDUCAID
L.NER
EDUCAID
EXPEDUC
L.NER
EDUCAID
Dependent variable NER (%) NER (%) NER (%) NER (%) NER (%)
L.NER 0.05 0.12 0.30 0.32** 0.39*
(0.77) (0.51) (0.18) (0.04) (0.08)
EDUCAID per capita 0.04 0.06* 0.05** 0.05** 0.08**
(0.26) (0.08) (0.03) (0.01) (0.03)
EDUCEXP 0.88 0.32 0.15 0.07 0.05
(0.18) (0.13) (0.34) (0.86) (0.73)
PTR 0.06 0.19 0.24** 0.25** 0.26***
(0.75) (0.19) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01)
YOUNG POP 1.35 0.47 0.25 0.21 0.16
(0.12) (0.22) (0.23) (0.25) (0.49)
GDP per capita 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
(0.19) (0.20) (0.80) (0.68) (0.63)
BUDGET (surplus) 0.56 0.37 0.03 0.11 0.17
(0.13) (0.12) (0.87) (0.66) (0.49)
INFLATION 0.28 0.07 0.01 0.02 0.02
(0.47) (0.41) (0.35) (0.24) (0.21)
OPEN 0.04 0.05 0.04 0.04* 0.05
(0.69) (0.24) (0.13) (0.07) (0.14)
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Table A3 (Continued )
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Method Arellano&Bond Arellano & Bond,
robust
Blundel & Bond,
robust
Blundell & Bond,
robust
Blundell&Bond, robust;
additional IV: ENERGYAID
Variables considered endogeneous L.NER
EDUCAID
NER (%)
L.NER
EDUCAID
L:NER
EDUCAID
L.NER
EDUCAID
EXPEDUC
L.NER
EDUCAID
Dependent variable NER (%) NER (%) NER (%) NER (%) NER (%)
FREE 5.06** 3.59** 1.07* 1.10** 1.34**
(0.02) (0.04) (0.05) (0.03) (0.02)
Observations 150 150 260 260 257
Countries 88 88 110 110 108
Wald chi2(17) = 33244 chi2(17) = 9936 chi2(18) = 1180 chi2(18) = 584.9 chi2(18) = 346
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Hansen chi2(2) = 0.84 chi2(4) = 4.56 chi2(4) = 3.32 chi2(6) = 4.03 chi2(2) = 1.45
(0.66) (0.34) (0.51) (0.67) (0.49)
AR1 z = 0.127 z = 0.531 z = 0.636 z = 0.916 z = 1.368
(0.90) (0.60) (0.53) (0.36) (0.17)
AR2 . . . . .
Instruments 19 21 23 25 21
Source: See Appendix, Table A1.
Notes: Missing value indicators for imputed variables are included as controls but not shown. The preﬁx ‘L.’ denotes a lagged variable. p-values in parentheses.
* Signiﬁcance at the 10% level.
** Signiﬁcance at the 5% level.
*** Signiﬁcance at the 1% level.
Table A4
The effect of education aid on primary school enrolment, all developing countriesa (as Table 1, but unrestricted set of countries).
(1)
System GMMb
(2)
FEc
(3)
FEc
(4)
FEc,d
Variables NER (%) NER (%) NER growth (%) NER growth (%)
L.NER 0.39** 0.00
(0.02) (0.96)
EDUCAID per capita 0.04** 0.04** 0.01 4.65
(0.01) (0.03) (0.73) (0.13)
EDUCEXP 0.29 0.38 0.42 6.30
(0.42) (0.10) (0.58) (0.47)
PTR 0.32*** 0.19 0.18 9.09
(0.00) (0.25) (0.58) (0.52)
YOUNG POP 0.07 0.30 1.73* 45.64
(0.68) (0.53) (0.09) (0.19)
GDP per capita 0.00 0.00** 0.00 3.59
(0.55) (0.01) (0.93) (0.72)
BUDGET (surplus) 0.29 0.26 1.74*** 1.47***
(0.19) (0.32) (0.00) (0.00)
INFLATION 0.03** 0.02 0.40** 4.60
(0.03) (0.81) (0.04) (0.11)
OPEN 0.03 0.07* 0.08 1.41
(0.19) (0.07) (0.52) (0.91)
FREE 1.08** 1.84 8.94** 8.26**
(0.02) (0.28) (0.02) (0.03)
Observations 309 309 309 305
Countries 131 131 131 131
R2 (within) 0.44 0.28 0.30
Wald chi2(18) = 895.1
(0.00)
Hansen chi2(6) = 4.74
(0.58)
AR1 z = 1.15
(0.25)
AR2 .
a Constant or ﬁxed effects (as relevant, see below), and missing value indicators for imputed variables are included but not shown. The preﬁx ‘L.’ denotes a lagged variable.
Robust p-values in parentheses.
b Replication of Michaelowa and Weber (2007, Table 1, Regression 4) with new dataset (see also Appendix Table A3).
c Including both country and period ﬁxed effects.
d Explanatory variables and controls are all in logs except for BUDGET (because of the numerous negative values) and PTR, which is a categorical variable.
* Signiﬁcance at the 10% level.
** Signiﬁcance at the 5% level.
*** Signiﬁcance at the 1% level.
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